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The Accountability Principle: Legal Solutions
to Break Corruption’s Impact on
India’s Environment
The biggest problem facing India’s environment is not a lack of
environmental laws.  We have dozens.  Nor is it a lack of prece-
dent to protect our environment.  This has been developed incre-
mentally in India’s Supreme Court over the last twenty-five
years.  The single biggest issue facing India’s beleaguered, yet re-
silient environment today is the failure of the Indian government
to adequately enforce existing environmental laws.  There is no
excuse good enough, no obstacle obtrusive enough, and no cir-
cumstance restrictive enough to exonerate the government from
failing to perform its statutory duty to arrest environmental de-
cline.  Restoring India’s environmental quality, preserving its
natural resources, and creating a sustainable way of life for In-
dia’s burgeoning population are not intangible dreams—they are
within reach.  But every day the Indian government fails to move
* Mahesh Chander (M.C.) Mehta is a practicing attorney in the Supreme Court of
India, and possibly one of the best known and most effective public-interest environ-
mental attorneys in the world.  Winner of the 1996 Goldman Environmental Prize
and the 1997 Magsaysay Award among others, Mr. Mehta’s work has touched nearly
every corner of India.  He has obtained more than forty judgments and hundreds of
Supreme Court orders against polluters.  He is perhaps best known for his role in
persuading the Supreme Court to find a constitutional right to a healthy environ-
ment, his work to protect the Taj Mahal from air pollution, and his efforts to enforce
pollution controls on thousands of industries along the holy Ganges River.  For
years, the Supreme Court of India set aside a courtroom every Friday exclusively for
Mr. Mehta’s cases.  This piece is an edited excerpt from Mr. Mehta’s forthcoming
book, In the Public Interest , detailing his seventeen biggest cases.  Mr. Mehta would
like to thank Aaron Grieser, J.D. candidate, 2007, University of Oregon School of
Law, for his contributions to the book and this article.
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its hands.  Our government fails to perform its duty.  Bold action
is necessary.
Each chapter in my life’s work fighting for India’s environment
points to government failure.  Each problem highlighted in my
battles was either a direct result of government actions or a lack
of government action where it was blatantly needed.  This com-
mon thread has tied all of my cases together to establish one glar-
ing truth: that India’s executive branch of government bears the
greatest responsibility and blame for India’s environmental de-
cay.  Though other factors contribute, the executive branch of
government has either passively allowed or actively contributed
to the environmental tragedy unfolding around Indians every
day.  There is no excuse.
I have spent the bulk of my twenty-five year career in environ-
mental law working to build effective precedent for environmen-
tal protection through the Indian Supreme Court.  Over the
years, the Court has evolved all the operative principles neces-
sary for a strong environmental jurisprudence.  Moreover, the
Court’s action has also spurred the legislature into passing a
plethora of environmental laws and rules that, at a minimum,
empower the executive branch to take all steps necessary to pre-
serve India’s environment.  Finally, the Supreme Court has gone
to exhaustive lengths to request, instruct, direct, and order the
executive branch to execute its constitutional duties.  In my cases
alone, the Court has issued thousands of orders pertaining to en-
vironmental enforcement.  To this end, the executive branch,
under the Supreme Court’s direction, has set up a number of ad-
ministrative bodies to manage India’s environment, from coastal
authorities, to groundwater authorities, to river authorities.  The
list goes on.  The Court has exercised its constitutional powers to
give the executive branch all the support, all the guidance, all the
direction and all the tools it needs to fulfil its duty.  Our apex
judicial body has put the ball squarely in the executive’s court.
Yet the executive continues to fail.  It is a sad opus.  With each
day that passes India’s environment suffers ever-greater destruc-
tion.  Each claim of progress that the environmental offices de-
clare rings more hollow.  Each day the goals of the
environmental branches of government slip further out of reach
as the environment falls into further decline.  The truth is that
the environment is not the government’s priority.  The poor are
not a priority.  Our international commitments are not a priority.
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\21-1\OEL104.txt unknown Seq: 3 10-JAN-07 11:55
2006] The Accountability Principle 143
Our public health is not a priority.  Our fundamental rights are
not a priority.  Instead our leadership is narrowly focused on
rapid, unsustainable development programmes, on expansion of
nuclear energy, on exploitation of resources, and on building un-
viable large-scale dams.  It is difficult to convey the gravity of our
leadership’s misdirection.  The scope of our government’s vision
is narrow.  The long-term is lost to the short-term.  The govern-
ment is supposed to be the glue that holds our society together,
yet the public’s faith in the government is disintegrating, weaken-
ing our civil bonds.  The government is facing a crisis of confi-
dence.  Though problems exist in each branch of government,
none are more serious than the breakdown in the executive
branch.  The enforcers themselves are abrogating the law.  As a
result, the rule of law in India crumbles.  This can only lead to
further destruction, disintegration, and violence.
The great Court-led victories for the environment brought
hope to the hearts of millions of Indians.  Many millions of Indi-
ans saw Public Interest Litigation (PIL) as an avenue for justice.
While justice was delivered in the courts, it was flogged in the
executive.  The Court’s directions quickly lost traction as they
were handed over to the executive branches for enforcement.
Order after order went unimplemented.  Order after order still
goes unimplemented.  As a result, the executive continues to
make a mockery of the Court, the Constitution, and our demo-
cratic system of government.  Environmental enforcement has
changed from being a part of the problem of environmental pro-
tection to becoming the problem.  The government has the man-
date, the power, the administrative structure, and the resources
to effectively reign in environmental destruction, but it fails.
The reasons for the failure of the executive branch are many,
but one reason stands out more than any other: corruption.
While corruption is not the sole contributor to the failings of the
executive branch in India, it is one of the worst and most con-
demnable—and the most urgent to address.  According to Trans-
parency International, “India stands high in the list of the ‘most
corrupt’ nations and virtually at the bottom of international as-
sessments of human development.”1  In Transparency Interna-
tional’s 2005 World Corruption Index, India scored only a 2.9 out
of 10 (10 being least corrupt).  Corruption pervades every level
1 R.B. JAIN & P.S. BAWA, NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEMS: COUNTRY STUDY RE-
PORT: INDIA 2003 26 (Transparency Int’l 2004).
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of Indian government, from high government officials to the low-
est inspectors.
The bureaucracy cannot police itself.  The administration has
shown its inability to control corruption within its ranks.  India
has a plethora of bureaucratic rules and regulations aimed at
tackling corruption and keeping bureaucrats honest.2  Unfortu-
nately, these rules’ effect is marginal at best.  Corruption, nepo-
tism, and apathy are still rampant in India’s executive branch.
The last thirty years have made it clear that leaving the govern-
ment to its own devices is grossly insufficient to stimulate the
necessary action.  The corruption is simply too deep.  The only
solution is to give the power back to the people by making bu-
reaucrats directly accountable to the public whom they are
charged to protect.
Corruption exists in every country, but its scale and pervasive-
ness vary dramatically.  The Centre for Science and Environment
observes:
Experiences from abroad . . . have something to teach us.  The
United States, Japan and South Korea are among the most dy-
namic countries in the world, but their higher political eche-
lons are riddled with corrupt practices.  What differentiates
these countries from India is that once a politician is en-
meshed in a corruption scandal, regardless of whether that
politician is a president or prime minister, he/she pays a price.3
In India corruption exists in all levels of government, and the
corrupt commonly pay little political price.  Many politicians and
bureaucrats pursue government jobs primarily because they
know that they will be able to exploit their positions to collect
kick-backs.  Corruption exists in all levels of the Indian govern-
ment, and in every branch, but the low-level corruption is by far
2 See generally ASIA DEVELOPMENT BANK, ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES IN ASIA
AND THE PACIFIC: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FIGHTING COR-
RUPTION IN TWENTY-ONE ASIAN AND PACIFIC COUNTRIES (2004).  Some examples
of India’s requirements: India requires all public officials to regularly disclose infor-
mation about their assets and liabilities, id.  at 12, periodic review and adjustment of
public officials’ salaries, id.  at 8, clear codes of conduct for public servants, id. , con-
flict of interest regulations to address public officials’ engagement in political or eco-
nomic activities, and restrict their engagement in private sector or investment
activities, id.  at 9-10, requiring officials to report the employment of a near relative
in an organization with which the public official is associated, id.  at 9, reporting any
gifts from outside parties exceeding a certain value must be reported to supervisors,
id.  at 10.
3 1 CENTRE FOR SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT, THE CITIZENS’ FIFTH REPORT: NA-
TIONAL OVERVIEW 391 (1999).
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the most serious.  When even the lowest regulators and inspec-
tors know that the system is corrupt, they too join in the sport
and seek to get as much out of the job as possible while they are
in power.  This makes a mockery of our entire governmental sys-
tem, and turns it against those with a genuine interest to serve
the public.  Corruption also shifts needed funds away from areas
of public service.  Thus the people who need the government the
most receive the least, and the people who deserve the least take
the most.  Our enforcement system has been turned completely
inside out.
When regulators egregiously ignore their duty to care for the
public, they directly encourage the spread of pollution and liqui-
dation of natural resources.  When highly polluting factories and
illegal development are condoned, we all suffer.  Further, corrup-
tion causes a liquidation of natural resources and a looting of the
treasury.  Our natural heritage and our common assets are plun-
dered.  This is a crime against the nation and our common heri-
tage.  Corruption has the most direct impact on the poor:
Corruption is a multi-faceted problem whose causes can be
equally multifarious.  Though corruption is largely borne out
of human greed, it can get exacerbated in highly divided socie-
ties, leading to a deadly combination of corruption and vio-
lence.  For those who have the resources to bribe, corruption
can be irritating and, as economists call it, a “transaction cost.”
But for the poor who cannot afford the ‘transaction cost’ cor-
ruption is tantamount to oppression and violence.4
The impacts of corruption on India’s people, her economy, and
her environment are profound, and amount to a clear violation
of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which the Supreme
Court has interpreted to guarantee every Indian the right to live
in a healthy environment.5
Public-interest litigation has played a critical role in expanding
environmental jurisprudence in India over the last twenty-five
years.  It was the procedural mechanism that allowed for citizen
suits against the government and polluters, and the tool that the
Court continues to use to protect our fundamental constitutional
rights.  Public-interest litigation can also be a way to forge ahead
in the next necessary step to save India’s environment: fighting
corruption.
4 Id.  at 392.
5 INDIA CONST. art. 21.  The article provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of
his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”
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Each public official has a responsibility to the public.  This is
uncontroversial.  Each government officer knowingly assumes
this responsibility when he or she takes office.  They are given
legal powers, legal rights.  Their legal rights inherently include a
legal duty of care to perform their tasks honestly and to the best
of their ability.  Therefore, each public servant has a heightened
duty of care to the public at large.  Their duty of care is much
greater than that of a normal citizen, because we citizens entrust
our officials with our wellbeing.  This duty is legally enforceable
against corrupt officials.
There is a dramatic imbalance in our governing system.  The
constitutional rights of Indian citizens are being undermined by
legal protection of public officials via their statutory authority.
These officials are shielded from liability.  Our public officials
have excessive power, with negligible accountability, while the
public is powerless against them.  This is reverse logic.  Adminis-
trative decisions do not extinguish our fundamental rights.
Rather, our fundamental rights shape the parameters of regula-
tory action.  Our entire democratic form of government is pre-
mised on the assertion that the government derives its power and
authority from the consent of the governed.  The people are the
ultimate repository of governmental authority.  When the gov-
ernment fails so blatantly to make good on the public’s consent
and the public’s trust, the public has a legal mechanism to re-
claim that power.  This mechanism is effectuated by asserting our
fundamental rights as citizens under our Constitution.  The situa-
tion in India is extreme and it calls for bold action.
This does not mean that the country should slip any further
into anarchy by people taking the law into their own hands.  This
takes place often enough already with the connivance of govern-
ment officials.  We should seek to use the democratic system of
checks and balances to flush out the problem.  We should hold
public officials accountable for their failings when they lead to
actual injury to individuals and the environment.  Right now
public officials in India are shielded from liability because of
their status as public servants.  But what happens when the gov-
ernment official ceases to serve the public, and instead becomes
self-serving?  Does this person still deserve the status and protec-
tion of a public servant?  And what if these acts of self-service
lead to serious injuries to people and the environment?  What if
it violates a citizen’s constitutionally guaranteed rights?  Should
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we still afford them the same legal immunity?  Shall we continue
to shield this person for robbing India of a sustainable future?
The scenario in India’s executive branch is dire and requires us to
take bold action.
The executive branch cannot rid itself of its cancer; the legisla-
tive branch cannot act directly.  The Indian judiciary is needed to
take urgent action.  The Indian judiciary is duty-bound to protect
the fundamental rights of its citizens, particularly when those
rights are violated by another branch of the government.  The
Supreme Court has an opportunity to exercise its powers, under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India, to protect the people’s
fundamental right to a healthy environment as enshrined in Arti-
cle 21.  In order to protect the fundamental rights of Indians, the
Supreme Court of India should adopt the Accountability Princi-
ple as a part of Indian jurisprudence.
The Accountability Principle derives its tenets from the com-
mon law doctrines of negligence and state liability.  The Ac-
countability Principle fundamentally holds that, by accepting
their post and taking their oath to serve, public officials assume a
legal duty not to infringe on citizens’ fundamental rights by per-
forming their duties negligently.  The Principle holds that public
officers have a legal duty to perform their official functions rea-
sonably, avoiding unreasonable and foreseeable harm to the en-
vironment.  The Accountability Principle is the logical next step
towards Good Governance in India.
The Accountability Principle
Good Governance is as much an internationally known phrase
as sustainable development.  Formally adopted by the United
Nations system, the World Bank and almost every other major
intergovernmental institution, the concept of Good Governance
requires governments to promote accountability, public partici-
pation, transparency, and a sound legal framework for equitable
development.  Government accountability is the most important
element of Good Governance.6 India has been working on sev-
6 There is no issue more central to Good Governance than accountability
generally and the accountability of those in government to their citizenry in
particular.  Consequently, there is no issue more central to any discussion
of the challenges facing government and civil servants . . . than the matter
of commitment to a high degree of accountability.  Indeed, issues of ac-
countability to citizenry are quite simply the most important elements of
contemporary governance, and as a consequence, need to be at the very
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eral pillars of Good Governance, but is woefully behind on hold-
ing its officials accountable for their actions.  The act of holding
officials accountable is implicit to democratic governance, for
government rule disconnected from the public’s will violates the
most basic democratic principles.  Democracies function because
the public can hold its representatives accountable, generally
through elections.  However, our unelected bureaucrats are
largely immune from liability even for the most negligent acts.
Some officials take advantage of this, knowing that they cannot
be held liable.
Each public official is empowered with the trust of the people.
This trust endows public officials with a heightened responsibility
as soon as he or she accepts public office.  The level of responsi-
bility depends on the type and nature of the post: the higher the
post, the greater the responsibility.  This is a characteristic of all
legal rights.  Under all common law legal systems, the rights that
citizens enjoy are encumbered by corresponding responsibilities.
For example, the right to own property inherently implies a re-
sponsibility not to use your property in such a manner as to in-
jure another.  Similarly, public officials are conferred special
rights and powers by the public.  We give these officials the legal
right to direct our actions, thus they also have the legal duty to
exercise their powers responsibly.  The official owes a duty of
care to the public to exercise power in the public’s interest—
plain and simple.  This is particularly important regarding envi-
ronmental laws, where dereliction of the officer’s duty leads to
serious environmental harm.
A practical solution is needed.  Corruption per se  is difficult to
identify and combat, but the results of corruption are not.  Cor-
rupt bureaucratic actions almost always amount to a negligent
performance of statutory duties.  By attacking the negligent per-
formance of duty, the Accountability Principle ties regulatory ac-
tion (and inaction) to its ultimate objective: the quality of the
environment.  The government needs to do more than root out a
few corrupt or nepotistic officials: the government needs to trans-
form the bureaucratic culture that breeds corruption.  By focus-
center of any discussion about Good Governance, education for the public
service and the future millennium.
Allan Rosenbaum, Director, Institute of Public Management and Community Ser-
vice, Good Governance, Accountability and the Public Servant, http://unpan1.un.
org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan005698.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,
2006).
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ing on negligent regulating, the Accountability Principle targets
both the corrupt and incompetent regulators, creating space for
more effective, upright public servants.  This process of discard-
ing unwanted officials starts by holding all public officials ac-
countable for their actions—by fastening their regulatory
performance to the environmental performance of their subjects.
It only makes sense to restore the balance between the regula-
tors’ duty and the public’s rights.
The Accountability Principle has its roots in the doctrines of
negligence and state liability.  The broad contours of the Ac-
countability Principle are well animated through what is known
as the doctrine of state liability.  The doctrine of state liability is
well established under European Community (EC) law.  Under
EC law, the doctrine establishes remedies for private citizens for
breaches of EC law by Member States.7  The doctrine is instruc-
tive in establishing a duty on state agents to enforce laws.  The
doctrine of state liability has been developed extensively by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) under EC law to deal with non-
enforcement scenarios; these scenarios are analogous to what is
happening in India.
Since its inception, the ECJ has issued several environmental
directives creating rights of action for the citizens of Member
States.  Yet the ECJ was completely dependent on the Member
States to enforce the decisions.  Problems arose when the Mem-
ber States would fail to enforce these directives.  To remedy this
situation, the ECJ developed the doctrine of state liability.  In the
watershed case of Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy ,8 the ECJ
found that there was a duty in EC law to make reparation for
injury caused by a Member State failing to comply with EC law.
The Court found that individual citizens would have a right of
action against their governments when illegal actions caused di-
rect injury to them.  Under later cases, the scope of liability was
refined to emphasize that Member States were liable to private
citizens for damage resulting from any infringement of EC law,
regardless of whether it was a failure to implement a directive or
7 STUART BELL & DONALD MCGILLIVRAY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE LAW
AND POLICY RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 141 (5th ed.
2004).
8 Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. I-
5357.
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any other breach.9  The ECJ found that state liability applied
when three conditions were met (1) the EC measure infringed
must have been intended to confer rights on individuals; (2) the
breach must have been “sufficiently serious”; and (3) there must
have been a direct causal link between the breach and the dam-
age suffered.
The first element of the doctrine, the intention to confer rights
on the individual, was more problematic in Europe than it is in
India, since the rights affected under Indian jurisprudence are
clearly laid out as constitutional rights.  Importantly, the second
element was designed to weed out less significant cases, and to
focus on the most serious offences.  Under ECJ law, a breach of
the duty to regulate would be found when the state “manifestly
and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion.”10  The third
element is established when there is a sufficient relationship be-
tween the regulator and the agent of harm (“agent”).  In such
situations the government actor is the gatekeeper, controlling the
agent’s ability to operate via issuing and suspending operating
licenses.  Thus, the doctrine of state liability evolved as a way to
overcome the enforcement deficit inherent in the EC’s structure,
and has been applied as a common remedy across EC Member
States.11  By creating this private right of action for citizens of
EC Member States, the ECJ found an effective way to stimulate
enforcement—by providing a remedy to injured citizens.
Where there is an infringement of a right, there must be a rem-
edy.  That remedy is rightfully imposed on the state.  When indi-
vidual regulators abuse discretionary powers, or wield their
status negligently, they cease to operate within the scope of their
employment, and thus open themselves to personal liability.12
They exceed their role as public servants.  The derogation of
their duty extinguishes their rights to immunity.  They are no
longer acting as the state, and for the benefit of the state—so
they should not be afforded the immunity given to state actors.
Under such situations, the negligent official should only be af-
forded the same protections as normal citizens, i.e., they should
9 See  Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. Germany, &
The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Transport, ex parte  Factortame Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I-
1029.
10 DAVID HUGHES ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 87 (Butterworths Lexis Nexis,
4th ed. 2002).
11 See BELL & MCGILLIVRAY, supra  note 7, at 141.
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D (1979).
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be held liable for their negligence.  In the United Kingdom’s bed-
rock case on the matter, Phillips v. Britannia Hygienic Laundry
Co. ,13 Lord Atkin stated that liability for failure to regulate
would be considered a breach of statutory duty, when “[t]he duty
may be of such paramount importance that it is owed to all the
public.”  When an officer assumes the role of a public official,
their duty is certainly owed to the public at large.  Under the
Accountability Principle, the official who exercises his or her
statutory powers negligently, so as to exceed the ambit of reason-
able discretion, becomes liable for their contribution to the dam-
age.14  In essence, violation of the Accountability Principle is an
allegation of negligent exercise of statutory discretion.
Once a duty of care has been established, the usual tests of
reasonable foreseeability, scope, fairness and reasonableness es-
tablished under tort law are used to determine liability.  For ex-
ample, liability can arise for a failure to warn the public of
danger, and failure to control foreseeable violations.  The issue of
proximity is important because the regulator is required to have
a control relationship between the regulator and the agent of
harm.  This could arise from negligent inspection, or complete
failure to inspect an agent of harm.  It could also arise from
granting a license to a factory that does not have pollution-con-
trol devices.  Liability would be limited to situations where it
would be fair, just, and reasonable to impose such a duty.
The Supreme Court is clearly empowered to apply the Ac-
countability Principle.  Common-law courts have the power of ju-
dicial review when the enforcement authorities do not follow
statutory procedures, when they arrive at decisions unfairly, or
when they make decisions beyond the scope of their statutory
authority.  In India, the judiciary also has the duty to protect the
fundamental rights of citizens, by issuing orders and directions to
the executive branch under the Constitution of India.  The Court
is bound to protect the fundamental rights of Indian citizens
under Article 32.  Pollution and nuisance resulting from mis-reg-
ulation infringes on the fundamental rights of Indian citizens, in-
cluding the right to life under Article 21.  When the other
13 Phillips v. Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co., [1923] 2 K.B. 832.
14 X v. Bedfordshire County Council, [1995] 2 A.C. 633, 736 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Eng.) (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson).  This generally only includes oper-
ational decisions, not policy decisions, thus attacking the exercise of power in the
field instead of that of faulty policy-making.
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branches of government fail to protect the fundamental rights of
Indian citizens, the burden necessarily falls to the judiciary to re-
dress their injuries.  Further, the Court is constitutionally man-
dated to provide checks and balances on the executive branch
when necessary.  Article 142 also gives the Court the power to
enforce decrees and may issue such orders as necessary for doing
complete justice in any case or matter pending before it.15  The
Court has issued several such orders and directions from time to
time.  Petitions for the protection of fundamental rights can be
raised by individual citizens under a PIL, for example, and be
used to create the necessary link between the regulators’ actions
(and omissions) and their ultimate outcome.
Breach of that legal duty should lead to legal liability.  Breach
of the duty should be found when three conditions are met (1)
the official must share a relationship of proximity with the public,
sufficient to establish a legal duty; (2) the harm resulting from
the dereliction of duty must have been sufficiently serious, and a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the official’s action or
omission (infringement of a fundamental right is sufficiently seri-
ous per se); and (3) there must have been a sufficient causal link
between the breach and the damage suffered.
Under such circumstances, citizens would be able to hold offi-
cials responsible when lapses of duty cause serious injury to the
public.  The first element assures that the government official is
in the same sphere of influence, protecting unrelated government
officials from liability.  The legal duty can be established by the
Constitution, by statute, and by court order under Article 32.
The second element assures that the actions would be sufficiently
serious to avoid frivolous claims.  The third element protects offi-
cials who were not involved in the regulatory process.  Thus, the
Accountability Principle focuses liability effectively on the errant
official.
The errant official should be both criminally and civilly liable,
depending on the nature of the infraction.  Naturally, if the sec-
tions of the Penal Codes are violated it should give rise to crimi-
nal liability.  This is already well-established under Indian law.
15 Under this power the Court has imposed fines of Rs. 6 million on a minister of
the Central government for abusing discretion (by allotting government accommo-
dation on the basis of favouritism).  The Court also imposed a Rs. 6 million fine on a
minister for irregular allotment of petrol pumps without following a fair criterion
and showing favours to allottees. JAIN & BAWA, supra  note 1, at 56.
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But civil liability is also critical, both to provide a remedy for the
victims of negligent regulation and to create the deterrent effect
within the enforcement agencies.  Since the failure to act on the
part of such an official creates negligence per se , the regulator
himself or herself should be found contributorily negligent, at
best, and criminally culpable at worst.
The negligent regulator is a cause of pollution.  Their actions
and inactions are inextricably linked to the poor environmental
performance of India’s agents of harm.  When regulators rou-
tinely grant industries permits to operate without the necessary
pollution controls, they allow pollution to happen.  Their deci-
sion to permit an industry to set up, or to continue operating,
without pollution controls is hardly distinguishable from the act
of the polluter.  The regulator exercises a controlling relationship
over the polluter sufficient to establish causation.  The two form
a unified nexus of environmental destruction; thus, both should
be liable.  If the victims of pollution cannot hold the gatekeeper
liable, there is no effective deterrent for this type of behaviour.
The public has a right to a remedy against the negligent regula-
tor.  Therefore, the same liability that is imposed on polluters
should also apply to the negligent regulator, and the negligent
regulator should be held jointly liable along with the polluter.
Operationally, when a right has been violated as a result of the
actions of an agent, the petitioner would have a right of action
against both the agent and the regulator.  The Accountability
Principle holds that when there is a violation, a presumption of
liability is created against the regulator.  Liability is limited to
situations where the regulator should have reasonably foreseen
the resulting violation, and it is reasonable to impose a duty of
care.  These provisions limit liability to only the most serious
cases of negligence—when the regulator “manifestly and gravely
disregards” the limits on his or her discretion.16  In these cases,
the regulator should have found the problem and should have
taken action against the polluter, but did not.  In these instances,
the official’s actions contributed to a direct injury to a person.  In
such instances, the official should be held jointly and severally
liable to remedy the situation, leaving it up to the regulators and
polluters to battle out their portions of contribution to the
remedy.
16 HUGHES ET AL., supra  note 10, at 87.
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The scope of liability and operative principles of the Accounta-
bility Principle should be identical to that under the Polluter Pays
Principle.  In Indian environmental jurisprudence, the polluter is
liable to pay for damages to people and their property as well as
reversing any environmental degradation.17  Under the Polluter
Pays Principle, the burden of proof shifts to the polluter to prove
that their actions were environmentally benign.  Similarly, under
the Accountability Principle, the burden of proof also shifts to
the errant regulator to prove that his actions (or omissions) were
not a contributing factor to the damage in question.  This means
that when an incident occurs under their watch, there will be a
presumption of contribution, which the errant official will have
to disprove.  If the government can show that the polluter’s ac-
tions were sufficiently clandestine, the official may have a legal
defence.  Creating the presumption of negligence for harm to the
environment is in harmony with both the Polluter Pays Principle
and the Precautionary Principle, where, under Indian case law,
the statutory authorities must anticipate, prevent, and attack the
causes of environmental degradation.18  Shifting the burden of
proof will also overcome the insurmountable difficulty of proving
instances of corruption, which are usually concealed in the
shadows.  Instead, it focuses on the results of corruption when
they lead to the infringement of another’s rights.
Further, since power is shared within a regulatory agency, lia-
bility should be joint and several within the agency, extending
from the official who failed to perform, up the chain of command
as far as negligence is found.  Liability should be extended to
those with decision-making authority over regulating.  This
means that not only would the field regulator be held liable, but
that liability would also extend from that person up to the top of
their department.  This will stimulate a system of accountability
within the enforcement agencies.  This will put the spotlight on
both high- and low-level inefficacy, and create a structural incen-
tive within the agency for higher-ups to weed out corruption in
the lower levels of their organization.  All in all, these guidelines
will allocate responsibility where it is due, distributing it justly
across the enforcing agency.
17 See  Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1996 S.C.
1446, (1996) 3 S.C.C. 246.
18 See  Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 S.C.C. 647.
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Finally, the penalty and damages should vary depending on the
offence.  As mentioned, criminal liability should be imposed
where appropriate.  In both criminal and civil liabilities, penalties
should be strict enough to create a deterrent effect.  If the regula-
tor gets Rs. 100,000 in pay-offs from a factory and is only fined
Rs. 10,000 in response, he or she will continue his or her corrupt
behaviour because corruption will still be a profit-making ven-
ture.  As the Court has stated, “the measure of compensation in
[industrial accidents in hazardous industries] must be correlated
to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such
compensation must have a deterrent effect.”19  The same princi-
ple should apply to the negligent regulator.  Thus, when the ben-
efits of malpractice outweigh the penalties, the guilty party
should be liable for exemplary and punitive damages where ap-
propriate.  This will give the Court flexibility to tailor the remedy
to do justice in any situation.
But India’s courts cannot do it alone.  Parliament should pass
corresponding enactments to ensure that once an official is found
guilty or liable under the Accountability Principle, that person
should be barred from public service—effectively putting an end
to the practice of simply shifting corrupt officers to different
agencies once trouble starts to brew.  Further, the Union of India
should take care to provide adequately for its public servants.
This means increasing salaries and the staff in the agencies to
allow staff to be able to effectively discharge their duties.  It
means improving benefits so that officials don’t have to turn to
corruption.  It means reinventing what public service means in
India, to make it a job of the highest moral calibre—a job of
pride.
Still, the ultimate solution to the problem is a strong grassroots
movement, where each citizen understands the importance of en-
vironmental sustainability and vigilantly acts to keep a check on
their public servants, demanding accountability.  Public aware-
ness and civic action is the only long-term solution.  In the
meantime, we should earnestly put our hands toward making a
difference now.  All of us should do what we can to fight corrup-
tion.  India is in dire need of a powerful weapon to discourage
negligence within the government.  The current anti-corruption
laws require the petitioner to prove an alleged act of corruption.
19 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 819, 824 (1986).
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These acts are all but invisible to the public’s eye—but their ef-
fects are not.  The Accountability Principle is a much more effec-
tive avenue to root out corruption.
Though the bulk of Indian citizens do not yet prioritize these
issues, adopting the legal tenets of the Accountability Principle
will give those citizens that are concerned—and that do care—
the power to take action against the most serious threat to In-
dia’s future.  Thus, the Accountability Principle and its legal ten-
ets are a realistic and immediate way to take the obvious next
step toward Good Governance.  The problems run so deeply in
the Indian government that serious and bold action is necessary.
Small, timid steps are sorely ineffective.  Accountability is more
than a possibility: it is a necessity, lest we are satisfied to see our
environment, our fundamental rights and our common future
squandered.  Let us not waste this opportunity to take control of
the world we live in, and the world that we will pass on to our
children.
